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 The gestational surrogate – and her economic and educational 
vulnerability in particular – is the focus of many of the most persistent worries 
about paid surrogacy.  Those who employ her, and those who broker and organize 
her services, usually have an advantage over her in resources and information.  
That asymmetry exposes her to the possibility of exploitation and abuse. 
 State laws across the U.S. are still ambivalent about paid surrogacy.  Many 
states have no surrogacy laws at all, and there is no orthodoxy among those that 
do.  States that explicitly address the gestational surrogate’s vulnerability 
generally do so in a crude way.   
Some make paid surrogacy contracts illegal, even though this may 
compromise women’s autonomy; others simply nullify surrogacy contracts in 
disputes, as New Jersey did in the well-known Baby M case.  Because of her 
likely financial circumstances, the New Jersey Supreme Court argued that paying 
a gestational surrogate may ‘make her decision less voluntary’.1  Candidate 
surrogates tend to have significantly lower incomes than their employers, and so 
are more subject to coercion in such circumstances; for this reason, and also from 
concerns about the best interests of children, the Court determined that the 
surrogacy contract in the Baby M case was invalid. 
                                                 
1
 Supreme Court of New Jersey. 1988. In the Matter of Baby M. 109 NJ 396, 537 A.2d 1227. 
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Other writers advocate making paid surrogacy explicitly legal, arguing 
that among a woman’s reproductive rights should be the freedom to enter into 
contracts that pay for gestational labor.  But even those who occupy this position 
worry about the gestational surrogate’s vulnerability.  One answer is to ensure 
that the surrogate who changes her mind and wants to keep the resulting child 
may do so.  Modeled after adoption statutes with a similar opt-out clause, this 
approach leaves an important sort of power and autonomy in the hands of the 
surrogate.2 
 We want to suggest a new and additional answer to these worries – one 
that both protects the gestational surrogate and enhances her autonomy.  We 
propose that states that allow paid surrogacy should require, as a minimum 
necessary requirement for the contract to be legal, that the surrogate participate in 
a short class on contract pregnancy.  The content of this class, which we will 
discuss more below, would include information about the experience of other paid 
surrogates, what can and cannot legally be required of surrogates, and alternative 
forms of employment.  The class will improve the surrogate’s opportunity to 
make an autonomous decision and guard her right to make choices about 
reproduction and her body. 
                                                 
2
 B. Steinbock. Surrogate Motherhood as Prenatal Adoption. Law Med Health Care 1988; 16(1): 
44-50. 
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Policies of this sort, sometimes called ‘soft law’,3 require an individual to 
be well-informed before pursuing activities that include some important risk.  We 
will argue that a soft law policy in the case of paid surrogacy addresses central 
concerns about the gestational surrogate’s vulnerability.  A legal ban forbids too 
much, and bald legal permission allows too much; but a soft law educational 
requirement strikes the right balance.  A soft law approach would also enhance 
surrogate autonomy in place where surrogacy is already legal. 
 
I. Concerns about Paid Surrogacy 
 We will begin by examining concerns about paid surrogacy that focus in 
some way on the surrogate’s vulnerability.  Some of the arguments can be 
answered sufficiently, as we will show, but others will persist.  The legal solution 
we propose offers some new answers to the remaining concerns.  
 We will need some terms for the people involved in the contract.  First, the 
‘contracting couple’ is the couple who, in an attempt to have a child, wishes to 
employ a surrogate.4  In most cases, they will become the legal parents of the 
child after its birth.  The woman who enters an agreement with the contracting 
couple to carry a child in her womb is the ‘gestational surrogate’, ‘surrogate 
                                                 
3
 The term was originally used in the context of international law for codes which have little or no 
binding force.  Here we use it as a term for binding, enforceable laws that mandate some 
performance or activity in order for one to obtain a certain legal permission.  We describe soft law 
more below. 
4
 The contractor may be a single person instead; but for simplicity, and since the majority of 
arrangements involve couples, we will use the term for the more common type of case. 
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mother’, or ‘surrogate’ – terms we will use interchangeably.  There is some 
concern that the term ‘surrogate’ is prejudiced against her, since it already invites 
the view that she occupies a less important role in the creation of the child than 
the contracting couple.  We share this concern about the term, but it has become 
relatively standard, and alternative terms also have problems. 
The child may have a genetic tie to the gestational surrogate; her egg 
could be fertilized with the sperm of the contracting father.  It could also happen 
that the surrogate shares no genes with the child she carries; a fertilized egg could 
be implanted into her womb.  Some discussions distinguish the two situations 
with different terms for the surrogate (for example, ‘traditional surrogate’ and 
‘gestational surrogate’ respectively).5  In the arguments we will present, it does 
not make a difference which of the two situations the surrogate is in, so we will 
not use terms that reflect the distinction.   
 
 (1) Surrogacy contracts require a woman to perform nine months of 
gestational labor and then sever all ties to the child almost immediately after its 
birth.  Some see surrogacy as a more subtle form of prostitution; the woman in 
effect sells her womb and relinquishes control of her body.  Prostitution is 
generally not legal in the United States, and since surrogacy seems to be along the 
same lines, the worry goes, it should not be legal either.  The argument is that a 
                                                 
5
 J.K. Ciccarelli, & J.C. Ciccarelli. The Legal Aspects of Parental Rights in Assisted Reproductive 
Technology. J Soc Issues 2005; 61(1): 129.  Note that Ciccarelli and Ciccarelli use the term 
‘gestational surrogate’ more narrowly than we do. 
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woman should not be able to enter into a contract in which she sells her body 
under these circumstances.6  Call this the ‘prostitution argument’. 
The prostitution argument is sensitive in some ways to the gestational 
surrogate’s vulnerability, but it’s somewhat off target.  For instance, prostitution 
and surrogacy have importantly different objectives.  Prostitution consists in the 
selling of women’s bodies for sexual satisfaction; but the aim of surrogacy is to 
bring a child into the world.  Even though both are services performed for money, 
the analogy is not solid – it is hard to compare prostitution and surrogacy when 
their purposes are so different.  Another objection to the prostitution argument is 
that people are allowed to ‘sell their bodies’ in a broad variety of other ways.  In 
the U.S., people can sell eggs and sperm, plasma, hair, and they can accept jobs 
that are known to compromise their physical health.  Coal workers who know that 
mining poses serious health risks – they know they are potentially shortening their 
lives by accepting the job – are still allowed to make that decision.  There is no 
reason to think that surrogacy is more like prostitution, an illegal form of ‘body-
selling’, than it is like egg-selling, or any of the other legal forms of ‘body-
selling’. 
Another objection to the argument about ‘body-selling’ is that surrogacy 
contracts do not actually turn women’s bodies into objects of sale.  There is a 
difference between ‘compensating a woman for her services, and paying a woman 
                                                 
6
 S.A. Ketchum. 1992. Selling Babies and Selling Bodies. In Feminist Perspectives in Medical 
Ethics. H.B. Holmes & L.M. Purdy, eds. Bloomington & Indianapolis. Indiana University Press: 
290.  
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for the use of her body’.7  To illustrate this difference, consider lawn mowing.  If I 
need my lawn mowed, there are two possibilities: I can pay you to use your 
lawnmower, in which case I would take possession of your lawnmower for an 
agreed period of time; or I can pay you for you to use your lawnmower to cut my 
grass – in other words I would pay you for your service of mowing my lawn. 
‘Any right I have here is at most a right to insist that you do with your 
lawnmower what you said you would.  But that is not a right to your 
lawnmower.’8  Surrogacy is more like the case of being paid for the service.  The 
contracting couple does not gain a right to do whatever they please with the 
woman’s body while she carries the child.  The most they can do is ask that she 
do with her body what she agreed to do in the contract.  In surrogacy, then, a 
woman is not ‘selling her body’ but being compensated for her services. Heidi 
Malm says there is no more commodification in paying a surrogate than ‘paying a 
surgeon to perform an operation, a cabby to drive a car, or a model to pose for a 
statue’.9  That’s putting it too strongly – the surrogate’s service is more intimate 
and bodily invasive than that of the surgeon, the cabby and the model – but the 
prostitution analogy is still misleading.10 
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 H.M. Malm. 1992. Commodification or Compensation: A Reply to Ketchum.  In Feminist 
Perspectives in Medical Ethics. H.B. Holmes & L.M. Purdy, eds. Bloomington & Indianapolis. 
Indiana University Press: 297. 
8
 Ibid. 
9
 Ibid: 297. 
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 For more critical analysis of the prostitution analogy, see L. M. Purdy. Surrogate Mothering: 
Exploitation or Empowerment? Bioethics 1990; 3(1): 24-26. 
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(2) A related concern is that paid surrogacy is ‘baby-selling’.  Like the 
prostitution argument, which argues against the sale of women’s bodies, the baby-
selling argument contends that surrogacy contracts turn children into objects of 
sale, which devalues their lives, and maybe broader human life as well.  
Commodification of this sort, the argument says, is an attack on human dignity: 
the child’s, but also the surrogate’s, the contracting couple’s, and everyone else’s, 
too. 
Like the gestational surrogate, children are vulnerable in surrogacy 
arrangements, and we agree that their interests should be carefully protected, 
although that is not our primary focus here.  We also agree that there are 
legitimate concerns about exposing gestation to marketplace norms.  But there are 
reasons to think that the baby-selling argument misfires.  First, just as in our 
objections to the last argument, the purpose of surrogacy is crucial.  The 
contracting couple want to be parents – they are not paying money to exploit the 
child or to make a profit from a resale.  Second, in most cases the contracting 
father has supplied the sperm to create the child.  He is genetically the father, so it 
seems odd to say he is buying his own child.  Third, contracts that ensure that the 
surrogate can change her mind and keep the baby – the opt-out clause that we 
mentioned above – help preserve the sense that she is selling a service, not a 
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child.  Contracts without an opt-out clause are more easily interpreted as selling a 
product or outcome instead of a process.11   
Most remaining objections about baby selling should be directed at 
surrogacy brokers, rather than the gestational surrogate or the contracting couple, 
both of whom stand in some danger of being exploited by these brokers.  And in 
any case, worries about third parties profiting from the contract are already 
present in many adoption arrangements.12 
 
(3) Even if these first two arguments are answered, it’s true that 
compensation is an important incentive for many gestational surrogates.  Kelly 
Oliver only mildly overstates the situation when she says that ‘very few women, if 
any, would perform surrogacy services without payment’.13  That surrogacy 
arrangements would significantly diminish if paid surrogacy were illegal is itself a 
                                                 
11
 Although our concern in this paper is with the surrogate herself, issues about child welfare are 
deservedly the focus of much work on surrogacy.  We don’t presume to answer all the concerns 
about the exploitation, commodification, and well-being of the child.  For a collection of concerns 
about child welfare, see M. Brazier, M, A. Campbell, & S. Golombok. 1998. Surrogacy: Review 
for Health Ministers of Current Arrangements for Payments and Regulation. Report of the Review 
Team. London: Department of Health: 29-38. We do note that, as the Brazier Report speculates, 
enhancing surrogacy autonomy may lower some of the risk of psychological harm to the child. 
12
 One new worry that surrogacy does present is this: adoption concerns relinquishing an existing 
child, while surrogacy involves payment for the creation of a future child.  Our thanks to an 
anonymous referee for emphasizing this point.   
13
 K. Oliver. 1992. Marxism and Surrogacy. In Feminist Perspectives in Medical Ethics. H.B. 
Holmes & L.M. Purdy, eds. Bloomington & Indianapolis. Indiana University Press: 268. 
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sign that there is something wrong with the practice.  Or so says the 
‘compensation argument’.  
If the worry is that economic factors wrongfully force women into 
entering these contracts, it is not clear that women are forced in this way.  Many 
people would not do their jobs if they were not paid, not just surrogate mothers.  
Even people who love their work may do something else if they weren’t getting 
paid, simply because they need to earn a living somehow.  So the fact that most 
surrogates want to be compensated for their services is not enough to show paid 
surrogacy should be illegal. 
 
(4) Compensation aside, some think paid surrogacy should be illegal 
because the nature of the work is particularly unrelenting: the surrogate mother is 
‘never off-duty’.14  She is under contract for perpetual service, twenty-four hours 
a day, and ‘most people do not perform their service twenty-four hours a day, 
unless they are slaves’.15 
But most gestational surrogates have already had at least one child and are 
not unaware of the pains and restrictions of gestating.  And there are other jobs 
women perform where they are ‘never off-duty’.  Actors and models are restricted 
in many areas of their lives – what they eat, how they dress, where they go and 
with whom.  Public scrutiny keeps them always on-duty.  It is true that the 
consequences are not quite the same.  The actress who splurges on french fries 
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 Ibid. 
15
 Ibid. 
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and a milkshake hurts only herself.  If a surrogate mother goes ‘off-duty’, 
drinking alcohol or skipping a doctor’s appointment, she risks harm not just to 
herself but the fetus as well.  But the ‘never off-duty’ argument seems focused on 
the vulnerability of the surrogate, not the fetus, so the situations are similar 
enough. 
Also analogous is the case of doctors.  Doctors who are on call have 
certain responsibilities, and even when not on-call, they are never entirely off-
duty.  What they do in private areas of their lives can affect their work and in turn 
the health and safety of others.  The off-call doctor who gets intoxicated, even 
though he knows his troubled patient may need him later, could be compromising 
his responsibility to his patient.  Even in an ideal world, where division of 
physician labor were more fair, doctors would need to stay on-call for weeks to 
monitor the course of certain patients’ progress. 
Over the longer term, doctors are expected to remain informed about new 
medical developments.  Patients should be able to trust that doctors who 
graduated from medical school decades earlier aren’t unaware of advances in 
treatments and medications.  Much of this information doctors will need to 
assimilate when they are off-duty.  So even with its characteristic demands, paid 
surrogacy isn’t the only job with limitations on off-duty life. 
It’s also worth noting that surrogates, actors, and doctors still retain broad 
freedom about what they do, even when they are not fully off-duty.  Surrogates, 
for instance, can hold other jobs and care for their existing children. 
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 (5) The previous arguments don’t exhaust concerns about exposing 
gestation to the marketplace.  She is neither a prostitute nor a baby-seller, and she 
is not a slave; but some argue that the gestational surrogate is mistreated by the 
very nature of paid surrogacy arrangements.  On the ‘mistreatment argument’, 
paid surrogacy turns women’s bodies into commodities and means of production.  
‘In general, within the surrogacy arrangement, the “surrogate” is treated as a 
machine whose services can be exchanged for money.’16  Gender bias and 
economic inequality make this sort of abuse inherent in the practice.  The 
contracting couple simply uses her womb and controls her life.  Gestational labor 
is alienated labor, and the law should protect candidate surrogates from that.17 
 This argument overstates the power contracting couples have over 
surrogates.  When the gestational surrogate signs the contract, she makes an 
agreement to perform certain specific duties, but some state laws and court 
decisions have wisely limited the breadth of control contracting couples can 
exercise, as does legal precedent in general contract law.  The couple cannot use 
the surrogate’s body in any way they please; they can only expect that she carry 
out the specific expectations set forth in the contract.  And again, although the 
surrogate mother is never ‘off-duty’, she can anticipate the restrictions that 
healthy gestation will impose on her behavior; if she does not wish to submit 
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 Ibid: 275. 
17
 Kelly Oliver claims that surrogacy belongs in an especially invidious category of alienated 
labor: “estranged labor.” But Oliver seems unclear about what qualifies certain labor as estranged.  
Ibid: 274-276.  See also G. Corea. 1985. The Mother Machine. New York: HarperCollins; C. 
Overall. 1987. Ethics and Human Reproduction. Boston: Allen & Unwin.  
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herself to these restrictions, she does not have to sign the contract.  Even more 
traditional jobs restrict people’s behavior in one way or another.   
It is true that the surrogate is generally not on an equal footing with the 
contracting couple.  She is usually less economically well off and less educated 
then the couple,18 and so she enters surrogacy arrangements more vulnerable to 
mistreatment than the contracting couple.  But the stronger form of the 
mistreatment argument overstates both the level and risk of damage to the 
surrogate. 
 
(6) Some argue that surrogacy makes unfair predictive demands on 
women.  During gestation, it is common for a woman to develop strong feelings 
towards the fetus growing in her womb.  Contracts that demand that she harbor 
these feelings and then give up the child she has grown attached to are 
unreasonable.  Surrogacy asks a woman to decide how she will feel towards a 
child she carries but doesn’t intend to keep; but the extent and kind of connection 
she will feel is too difficult to predict.  It’s wrong, the ‘demanding prediction 
argument’ says, to require that she commit to a process whose effect on her is in 
principle impossible to foresee. 
To address this particular sort of surrogate vulnerability, many laws and 
brokers require her to have given birth to another child before being allowed to 
enter into a surrogacy contract.  But this provision may not be enough to answer 
the worry – when she was pregnant before she did not carry the fetus with the 
expectation of having to give it up after birth.   
                                                 
18
 See the data presented in argument seven below. 
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 Another way to address this vulnerability is to allow the gestational 
surrogate to change her mind and keep the child.  On this view, surrogacy 
arrangements should be more like most adoption arrangements.  But even if she 
can opt out, she has introduced expectations in the couple, and it may be painful 
for her to violate these expectations.  And some states (California, for instance, as 
suggested by the Calvert decision19) do not necessarily allow surrogates to opt out 
of the contract in this way.  Those states need some other way to address this 
particular vulnerability.20 
 
(7) Some think surrogacy contracts are unfair to women for a different 
reason: because women enter into these contracts under coercion.  The thought is 
that the surrogate’s choice process is burdened by circumstances that make it very 
difficult to resist agreeing to something she does not really want to do.  Call this – 
a more subtle relative of the compensation argument above – the ‘coercion 
argument’. 
On the simplest view of coercion, this argument doesn’t make sense.  
Paradigmatic cases of coercion involve limiting or removing an option, but 
surrogacy contracts actually present women with an additional option.  So how 
can it be that they are coerced into these contracts, when they have in fact gained 
another choice?  One answer is that the simple view of coercion isn’t correct: a 
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 Supreme Court of California. 1993. Johnson v. Calvert. 851 P.2d 776. 
 
20
 The demanding prediction argument is defended in S. Dodds & K. Jones. Surrogacy and 
Autonomy. Bioethics 1990; 3(1): 1-17, and challenged in J. Oakley. Altruistic Surrogacy and 
Informed Consent. Bioethics 1992; 6(4): 269-287. 
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new option can instead leave someone less free than she was before.  These are 
what some call ‘coercive offers’. 
To see this, consider the simpler, paradigmatic cases of coercion first. In 
these cases, the coercer pushes a target person to act in the way the coercer wants 
instead of the way the target wants, usually through threatening something 
horrible.  Some option formerly open to the target is either removed, or, more 
often, its appeal is severely limited.  Say an armed man approaches someone 
walking home from work and demands, ‘Give me your wallet or I’ll shoot’.  
Before the gunman appeared, the walker had a variety of open options.  The 
gunman has made exactly one of these options strongly compelling: giving up the 
wallet.  Technically, there are still multiple choices the walker can make: 
relinquishing his wallet, attempting to seize the gun, running away.  But the risk 
of being shot and perhaps killed in any but the first option is high.  The gunman 
has coerced the walker by making the alternative to giving up his wallet very 
costly.  So even in straightforward cases of coercion, the target can be left with 
other choices, but they are severely unappealing.   
There is another type of circumstance in which options can be made very 
costly – not by a demand enforced by a threat as in the walker and the gunman 
situation, but through an offer.  These ‘coercive offers’ are made to a target in 
some vulnerable situation such that she may believe that she cannot act in another 
way.  Like the gunman’s threat, these are offers that cannot be refused without 
great cost.  On a simple view of coercion, offers would always increase freedom: 
the target is presented with a new option that she did not have before, and she 
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does not lose any options that she had before; but certain cases make this simple 
view untenable. 
 Consider, for instance, the case of the lecherous millionaire.  ‘B’s child 
will die unless she receives expensive surgery….  A, a millionaire, proposes to 
pay for the surgery if B will agree to become his mistress.’21  In this example, B is 
presented with a new option; she can become A’s mistress and acquire the means 
to pay for the surgery that will save her child’s life.  However, from B’s point of 
view, there is seemingly no choice: either she sleeps with the millionaire, or her 
child dies.  So A has made B’s option of choosing not to be his mistress extremely 
costly.  She can refuse the offer – that choice is technically open to her – but the 
cost severely limits its appeal.  B’s inability to pay for life-saving surgery for her 
child puts her in a position such that A’s offer seemingly can’t be refused.  A put 
B into a situation comparable to that of the walker confronted by the gunman.  
The walker was coerced into giving the gunman his wallet because the gunman 
made the cost of noncompliance too high.  The walker could choose not to 
comply with the gunman, but this option is so unappealing that it can be said he 
was coerced into giving up his wallet.  B’s situation is analogous: the cost of her 
‘non-compliance’ with A’s offer is so high that we are justified in thinking she 
was coerced. 
Of particular importance is that B is in a position where she is very 
vulnerable to A’s offer.  We wouldn’t be concerned about B’s options if she did 
not have a child who would die without an expensive operation, or if B had other 
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  A. Wertheimer. 1997. Coercion. Princeton: Princeton University Press: 229. 
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reasonable means to raise the money.  Therefore, an important factor in the idea 
of coercive offers is the vulnerability of the party being coerced. 
In a similar way, some argue that paid surrogacy is a new but coercive 
option for many women.  There are women who may feel that there is no other 
way for them to make money.  Perhaps being a surrogate mother is not an 
attractive idea to them, but they feel that their other options are even more 
unappealing.  More than just unappealing, these other options are so costly that 
the women cannot seriously consider them.  By entering into a surrogacy contract, 
a mother who already has children can make a comparatively good amount of 
money and be able to stay at home with her other children while she works.  In 
this way, legal surrogacy contracts, although expanding numerically their options, 
seem to coerce women into making a choice they do not prefer, yet cannot refuse 
because the price of refusal is too high.   
One response to the coercion argument is that some women enjoy being 
pregnant; whatever their economic situation, surrogacy may not be a coercive 
offer for them.22  A second response is this: most surrogates may not be 
economically vulnerable enough for paid surrogacy to count as a coercive option.  
The best available data indicates that most gestational surrogates are married and 
have household incomes between $25,000 and $50,000 per year.23 This data does 
                                                 
22
 J.A. Robertson. Surrogate Mothers: Not So Novel After All. Hastings Cent Rep 1983; 13(5): 29. 
23
 Office of Technology Assessment. 1988. Infertility: Medical and Social Choices. Washington, 
D.C. Government Printing Office: 273-274.  This is the largest study of gestational surrogates in 
the U.S.  The study provides income amounts in 1988 dollars; we have adjusted these to 2005 
dollars.  There is very little more recent data on surrogate demographics, especially with the large 
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not show that the poorest women are entering into paid surrogacy contracts in 
substantive numbers.  Most surrogates are not so desperate for money that we 
should think of them as coerced.  Still, even few cases of possible coercion are 
morally worrisome.24  
 
 All of these arguments concern, directly or indirectly, the vulnerability of 
the surrogate.  We have shown that some fail in straightforward ways – in 
particular, the (1) prostitution, (2) baby-selling, (3) compensation, and (4) never 
off-duty arguments.  But the (5) mistreatment, (6) demanding prediction, and (7) 
coercion arguments all still carry important weight.  The risk to the surrogate of 
exploitation and abuse is not as severe as these arguments claim, but they do show 
that there is still plenty to worry about.   
 One response to the real vulnerability that these last arguments expose is 
to make surrogacy contracts illegal.  And indeed some states have done so, most 
often because of concerns about children, but also to protect candidate surrogates, 
our focus here.  But banning paid surrogacy buys protection at a very high cost: it 
deprives women of a deeply personal decision.  Most generally think people 
should be free to make choices that concern their own lives, and that the choices 
relevant to the most intimate parts of their lives – what they think and believe, 
                                                                                                                                     
sample size of the 1988 data.  A problem with all such data is that does not include the many 
surrogacy arrangements that are informal and unrecorded. 
24
 For more on coercive offers and undue inducements, see Dodds & Jones, op. cit. note 20; Purdy, 
op. cit. note 10; and E. J. Emanuel. Undue Inducement: Nonsense on Stilts? Am J Bioeth 2005; 
5(5): 9-13 (note also the follow-up articles in the same issue). 
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with whom they form relationships, and what they do with their bodies – should 
be protected the most strenuously.  To make it legally impossible for the surrogate 
to perform gestational labor, even commercial gestational labor, is to limit her 
autonomy too much.  Even if the surrogate is vulnerable to some exploitation, 
respect for her autonomy means not wholly removing paid surrogacy as one of 
her options.  Otherwise, she is wronged: nothing less than bodily autonomy is at 
stake here.   
 Making paid surrogacy legal isn’t just an unfortunate capitulation that 
autonomy demands.  Contracts, including the right sort of surrogacy contracts, 
can enhance and extend freedom in significant ways.   Marjorie Maguire Shultz 
writes that: 
Where arrangements involve several persons, where the opportunity for 
planning and deliberation exists, where reliance is weighty, where 
expectations are substantial and their validation is personally and socially 
important – as is true of reproductive agreements – contracts offer a means 
of arranging and protecting these various interests.25 
Shultz adds that contracts are a crucial resource for ‘projecting intention and 
choice into the future’.  Contracts make possible choices that wouldn’t be possible 
otherwise – they extend freedom and power.  Surrogacy contracts have this 
capability as well.26  The contracting couple gains the ability to have a child who 
                                                 
25
 Cited in N.R. Elster. Assisted Reproductive Technologies: Contracts, Consents, and 
Controversies. Am J Fam Law. 2005; 18(4). 
26
 Contracts are not an ideal model for many of the most crucial and intimate of human 
relationships, as feminist ethicists such as Virginia Held have argued (V. Held. 1987. Feminism 
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is (at least in part) genetically theirs, or at the very least the ability to initiate a 
pregnancy.  The gestational surrogate also gains freedom and power: a new 
opportunity for paid labor, and the experience of playing a crucial role in bringing 
new life into the world, without all the antecedent costs of child-raising. 
 So the dilemma is clear: the surrogate is vulnerable in important ways, but 
autonomy prevents a ban, and even positively supports the enhanced choice that 
surrogacy contracts make possible.  If surrogacy contracts are made illegal, 
women are wronged.  However, we saw earlier some unanswered concerns that 
surrogacy contracts themselves wrong women – by allowing them, the law seems 
to be failing to protect women in important ways.  We want to argue that there is 
an important and untapped legal tool that, short of a ban, addresses the most 
important vulnerability arguments.  We turn to that proposal now. 
 
II. A ‘Soft Law’ Solution 
 At present, the fifty U.S. states have varying laws (or no direct laws at all) 
regarding surrogacy.  Six states allow individuals and couples to enter into 
surrogacy contracts, and ten prohibit them in all or some instances.  The other 
thirty-four states have mixed or unclear laws and case rulings on whether or not 
surrogacy contracts are allowed.  Utah, in a recent and unexpected development, 
legalized some paid surrogacy arrangements in 2005.27  But almost without 
                                                                                                                                     
and Moral Theory. In Women and Moral Theory. E.F. Kittay & D.T. Meyers, eds. Totowa, NJ: 
Rowman & Littlefield: 111-128).  But we believe that in certain limited domains, including 
surrogacy, contracts can be autonomy protecting and freedom enhancing. 
27
 Utah bill S.B. 14, signed into law 16 March 2005. 
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exception these laws are too crude.  What they miss is a particular form of ‘soft 
law’. 
 ‘Soft law’ is that part of law concerned not with crimes and torts, but 
instead permissions.  Soft law mandates performances or activities that must 
occur before some sort of status change – performances and activities designed to 
protect some substantive state interest, such as public safety.  Driver’s license 
tests, marriage license procedures, and medical license procedures are all soft law.  
Sometimes soft law protects others (medical licenses); sometimes it protects the 
person seeking the status change as well: the driver’s license process certainly 
protects the driver, and in principle the marriage license process can protect not 
just possible offspring from disease, but also the couple from unknown health 
conditions and factual misrepresentation.  Protection of the vulnerable from harm 
is the most common justification of soft law. 
Consider another, less familiar example of soft law.  In the state of 
Connecticut, any couple with a child/children under the age of eighteen that seeks 
a divorce is required by the state to attend ‘Parenting Education Classes’.28  These 
                                                 
28
 Information in this section on Connecticut’s ‘Parenting Education Program’ is from the 
following two websites.  For the full text of the Connecticut divorce statute outlining the 
‘Parenting Education Program’, see: State of Connecticut General Assembly. Section 46b-69b 
Parenting Education Program. Hartford, CT: State of Connecticut. Available at: 
http://www.cga.ct.gov/2005/pub/Chap815j.htm#Sec46b-69b.htm [Accessed 9 Jul 2007]. For 
further state-issued information on the program, see: State of Connecticut Judicial Branch. 2005. 
Parenting Education Programs. Hartford, CT: State of Connecticut. Available at: 
http://www.jud2.state.ct.us/webforms/forms/fm151.pdf [Accessed 9 Jul 2007].   
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classes, a total of six hours in length, are intended to educate parents about the 
effects of divorce on children.  They also teach dispute resolution and offer advice 
on how to deal with the upcoming new family circumstances.  All of this is 
intended to reduce a negative effect of divorce: that which it has on children who 
must adapt to a new living situation.  Connecticut is not the only state to carry 
these requirements for divorcing parents.  Missouri’s ‘Focus on Kids’ program 
has similar rules and aims.29   
 A soft law approach to paid surrogacy can address the vulnerability 
arguments above while guarding a woman’s reproductive freedom.  We propose 
that states offer ‘Surrogate Education Classes’, completion of which is required of 
those who intend to enter legal paid surrogacy contracts.  The class would feature 
information about the surrogacy process: what contracts can and cannot 
legitimately demand of women, what past surrogates have said about their 
experiences, what other employment opportunities are open to women, and so 
                                                                                                                                     
The Connecticut program is successful: ‘Over 90% rate the course very beneficial in the 
initial evaluation and two-thirds continue to see benefits from the course six to twelve months 
later’ (Connecticut Council of Family Service Agencies. Parenting Education Program (PEP). 
Hartford, CT: State of Connecticut. Available at: http://www.ctfsa.org/programs/pep.html 
[Accessed 9 Jul 2007]). 
29
 For further information on Missouri’s ‘Focus on Kids’ program, see: University of Missouri-
Columbia (UM-C). 2006. Focus on Kids. Columbia, MO: UM-C. Available at: 
http://missourifamilies.org/fok/ [Accessed 9 Jul 2007].  For more on divorce soft law, see: E. 
Biondi. Legal Implementation of Parent Education Programs for Divorcing and Separating 
Parents. Fam Concil Courts Rev 1996 34(11): 82-95. 
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forth.30  The aim in all of this is to decrease the surrogate’s vulnerability – to help 
her be an informed, deliberate choice maker. 
 Some specific ways surrogacy classes answer the remaining vulnerability 
worries are these.  First, information about what is and is not legitimate in 
contracts is important because of the ‘mistreatment argument’ (argument five 
above).  We saw that even though the contracting couple’s control over the 
surrogate is restricted by some specific surrogacy laws and by legal precedent, the 
couple and surrogate are still on an unequal footing.  Contracting couples are 
generally better educated than gestational surrogates, and they are more likely to 
be informed about their rights and limitations in a contractual arrangement.  The 
surrogacy class can address some of this inequality.  Surrogates should learn that, 
for instance, while responsible gestation requires her to eat healthily, she retains 
control over crucial choices that affect her own body.  Surrogates should also 
learn about whatever other specific rights – such as the option to keep the child 
after birth – the specific state does or does not allow.31  For instance, class 
                                                 
30
 There are similar solutions outside the U.S. context, our focus in this paper.  Some states in 
Australia already use a soft law approach for other assisted reproductive technologies; in Victoria, 
for example, people who seek IVF treatment are required to obtain pre-treatment counseling about 
the treatment’s risks and benefits. In the U.K., the required counseling already provided by the 
HFEA could be expanded to include surrogate education. (We thank two anonymous referees for 
these suggestions.) 
31
 Legal limitations on what contracts can demand of surrogates, and the idea of an opt-out clause 
that lets the surrogate change her mind about keeping the child, can also help address the 
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members in California would learn that, at least in circumstances like those in the 
Calvert case, a surrogate who changes her mind may not keep the child.  Educated 
surrogates are less likely to be commodified and mistreated. 
 Second, class participants should hear the experiences of others who have 
worked as paid gestational surrogates.  Ideally, class members should meet former 
surrogates themselves directly; at a minimum, they should hear both statistical 
information – health, demographic, and other data – and personal stories written 
or recorded by past surrogates.  This element of the class helps address the 
‘demanding prediction argument’ (argument six above).  Former surrogates are in 
an ideal position to convey what it is like to gestate, with the intent not to raise, a 
being to whom they are either partly or not at all genetically related; they are the 
authorities on the sort of attachment that gestational surrogates come to feel.  
Candidate surrogates may have gestated their own children before, but this does 
not mean they will be able to accurately predict how they will feel in a surrogacy 
arrangement.  By hearing the experiences of others, their prediction will be better 
grounded and more cautious. 
 A third basic element of the class is information about other forms of 
employment.  The ‘coercion argument’ (argument seven above) suggested that 
even though paid surrogacy presents some women with a new opportunity, their 
socioeconomic circumstances may make it an encumbered, problematic 
opportunity.  While statistically surrogates do not tend to be among the absolutely 
                                                                                                                                     
vulnerability arguments.  But even so, we argue that required surrogacy classes are indispensable: 
these other approaches are useless if the surrogate doesn’t know about them. 
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worst off, they are still women whose circumstances are not entirely comfortable.  
Some may think that paid surrogacy is the only way they can earn additional 
money.  Some women, especially single women, may see surrogacy as a way to 
work while still taking care of their own existing children.  They may not be 
aware of what the surrogacy class can tell them: there are other jobs that can be 
done at home or jobs with subsidized day care and/or flexible hours.  Some of this 
information should be dispensed in written form (pamphlets, job resource contacts 
and phone numbers, etc.), and individual personal counseling, outside the class, 
may be important, too.  The more informed women are about genuine alternatives 
like these, the less vulnerable they are to coercion. 
 Developing a network with other surrogates can be another important 
result of the course.  Introducing the potential surrogate to others considering the 
same choice, as well as women who have already been surrogate mothers, will let 
her talk first hand with other women who may have, or once have had, the same 
concerns as she does.  If a surrogate mother has support, and is able to talk to 
other people who have gone through or are going through the same experiences, it 
will make the process easier on her.   
 Many of the details about the course can be left to the discretion of 
individual states, but we argue for the following additional structural elements.  
First, this should be a multi-session instead of a single-session course.  Retention 
will be higher if there are multiple sessions, and the (modest) time period between 
sessions will give the candidate surrogate a chance to reflect on her choice and 
bring her own questions back to the group.   
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Next, the total class time need not be long – six to eight hours of 
instruction and dialogue should be sufficient.  But at least two of these hours 
should consist of a one-on-one meeting between the candidate surrogate and a 
counselor.  The counselor can help the woman be reflective about the reasons for 
which she is entering the contract.  And time alone with each potential surrogate 
will allow the counselor to address specific concerns.  Without being in front of a 
large group of people or worrying about time constraints, the candidate surrogate 
is more likely to voice her own independent questions and concerns.   
A third issue concerns the cost of the classes.  There are four obvious 
candidate payers here: (1) the state, (2) one of the contracting parties’ health 
insurance plans, (3) the potential surrogate, or (4) the contracting couple.  
Because the course will not be cheap to run (it involves a paid instructor as well 
as someone qualified to provide one-on-one counseling), and because surrogacy is 
not a medically necessity (and so health insurance does not usually cover any fees 
related to the contract and procedure), it is difficult to justify obtaining the funds 
from either of the first two sources.  Also, because the surrogate is most often 
economically not well-off, it is unfair to ask her to pay for the class.  So the best 
option seems to be to include it in the costs a contracting couple will have to pay 
for the entire surrogacy process.  It is normal that a contracting couple foot the bill 
for the medical expenses, maternity clothes, and other pregnancy-related costs 
incurred by the surrogate.  It seems, then, most natural that the contracting couple 
subsidize the course as well. 
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Fourth, a required separate class session for the contracting couple may be 
important as well.  They too can benefit from hearing from former participants in 
surrogacy contracts, both so that their own expectations are realistic, and because 
the more sympathy and understanding they have for the experiences of gestating 
surrogates, the less vulnerable the surrogate herself. 
Finally, a candidate surrogate need only complete the program once, not 
every time she wants to enter a contact.  Childcare should be provided for class 
members – after all, some women choose surrogacy exactly because it allows 
them to work without being away from their children. 
It’s important to emphasize that the surrogacy course is not intended to 
steer women away from surrogacy.  Potential surrogates should be assured that 
the training and counseling is to help them, not hinder them.  In order to present 
the sort of information described above as neutrally and objectively as possible, 
care must go into choosing educators and counselors.  These class leaders should 
be familiar with surrogacy law and the surrogacy experience, or at the very least 
be able to marshal presenters who are.  It is important that they announce 
themselves as advocates for the women in the program.  They are not trying to 
scare or to prohibit candidate surrogates from making their own decisions.  The 
counselors and educators, rather, are working as proponents of the surrogate; they 
are trying to create a favorable and fair environment for the contracts to take 
place.  Upon completing the class, some may indeed decide not to become 
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surrogates.32 Those who do will be able to make a more reflective personal 
decision. 
This last point – that surrogacy courses are intended and structured to 
enhance, not restrict, the autonomy of the surrogate – is crucial.  It distinguishes 
our approach from other soft law approaches that, either explicitly or as revealed 
by the shape of the policy, simply attempt to discourage some behavior.  For 
instance, a state law that requires women seeking an abortion to first view pictures 
of the remains of aborted fetuses is unlikely to be aimed at enhancing their 
autonomy.  Soft law policies of the sort we defend here do exact costs (in time, 
energy, and other resources), and any benefits that don’t accrue to those who pay 
these costs, or any moral constraints that asymmetrically handicap them, demand 
special justification.  Our proposal meets this test in a way that other soft law 
approaches often do not: enhancing the candidate surrogate’s autonomy is both 
the explicit and structural aim of the surrogacy classes.  
And this proposal offers a way out of the dilemma that confronted us 
earlier – ban paid surrogacy, or respect a surrogate’s autonomy to expose herself 
to possible exploitation and abuse.  A ban wrongs women, because choices about 
what one does with one’s body are deeply personal and crucial; and legalizing 
crude paid surrogacy wrongs women, because of the asymmetric vulnerability of 
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 If they do decide against paid surrogacy, the Baby M case suggests that both the candidate 
surrogate and the contracting couple will be better off – and fewer children will face the sort of 
parental limbo that Baby M herself faced. 
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candidate surrogates.  We’ve described a neglected third way – a legal tool that 
honors and expands autonomy. 
 
